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NOTES
Accumulated Earnings Tax - Taxpayer's Purpose
in Accumulating Income
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed and collected an ac-
cumulated earnings tax from the Donruss Company for the tax years
1960 and 1961. Donruss filed an action for refund in the District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee. In response to two special interroga-
tories, the jury found (1) Donruss had accumulated its earnings beyond
the reasonable needs of the business, and (2) Donruss had not so accumu-
lated its earnings for the purpose of avoiding income tax with respect to
its shareholders. On the basis of these answers the court rendered judg-
ment for Donruss. The government appealed, alleging that the trial court's
charge' erroneously led the jury to believe that to answer the second inter-
rogatory in the affirmative they must find that Donruss had accumulated
its earnings for the sole purpose of avoiding personal income taxes on its
shareholders. The government contended that the proper test was less
stringent: whether in accumulating its earnings Donruss had as a purpose
or one of its purposes the avoidance of income taxes on its shareholders.
Held, reversed: The proper test in accumulated earnings tax cases is whether
the corporate taxpayer in accumulating its earnings has a dominant, con-
trolling, or impelling purpose of avoiding income taxes with respect to
dividend distributions to its shareholders.! Donruss Co. v. United States,
384 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S.
July 2, 1968).
I. THE ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX
The accumulated earnings tax provisions, first enacted in 1913, a estab-
lish two methods for determining whether a corporation has wrongfully
accumulated its earnings. Section 5324 sets out a subjective, "purpose" test,
placing a penalty tax on a corporation "formed or availed of" for the pur-
pose of avoiding income tax with respect to its shareholders.' In addition
'The trial judge charged the jury, inter alia: "If . . . the earnings here in question for the
two years under consideration, were accumulated for the purpose of meeting the reasonable business
needs . . . rather than for the purpose of avoiding taxes with respect to its sole shareholder, Mr.
Weiner, you will find for the plaintiff. ... Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292, 295
(6th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. July 2, 1968) (emphasis added).
' The result of this decision is that the taxpayer will have the burden of proving by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence that it had a dominant, controlling, or impelling purpose other than
to avoid personal income taxes on its shareholders. INT. Rev. CODE of 1954, § 533.
'Revenue Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 114.4
INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 532.
' Although the original accumulated earnings provision provided that the corporation had to be
fraudulently formed or availed of, Congress dropped the word 'fraudulently" in its 1916 revision.
Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756.
The original accumulated earnings tax provision also placed the penalty tax directly on the
shareholders. Due to the constitutional problem involving the taxing of shareholders on undistri-
buted profits, the Act as revised in 1921 placed the tax on the corporation itself rather than on
the individual shareholders. Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 227; see Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
189 (1920). However, the Supreme Court subsequently held that for one-man and closely-held
corporations Congress could constitutionally levy the tax on the individual owners rather than the
corporation. Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282 (1938).
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 532 now reads: "The accumulated earnings tax . . . shall apply to
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to the subjective test, section 5 3 3 (a)' establishes an objective standard for
determining a corporation's purpose in accumulating its income: if the
government proves that the corporation has accumulated its earnings be-
yond the reasonable needs of the business, this is "determinative" of the
corporation's purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to its share-
holders,' and the burden is on the corporate taxpayer to prove otherwise
A jury finding that the corporate taxpayer accumulated its earnings
beyond the reasonable needs of the business generally is the controlling
factor in an accumulated earnings tax case. The taxpayer's burden to rebut
the presumption of improper purpose which results from such a finding is,
as Congress intended,9 a heavy one. Moreover, corporate taxpayers often
submit evidence only on the issue of the reasonableness of the accumula-
tions, ignoring the possibility of proving that the corporation's purpose in
accumulating income does not violate section 532."° This is usually a mis-
take, because even if the government proves that the accumulation of
every corporation . . . formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with
respect to its shareholders .. . by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being
divided or distributed."
6INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 533(a), provides: "[T]he fact that the earnings and profits of a
corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be de-
terminative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to shareholders, unless the cor-
poration by the preponderance of the evidence shall prove to the contrary."
7INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 533(a).
' Id. The government need not attempt to prove that taxpayer accumulated its earnings beyond
the reasonable needs of the business and may elect to try the case solely on the purpose test in §
532. See Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 267 (1st Cir. 1963); Pelton Steel Casting
Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958).
Under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 533 (a) the taxpayer has the burden of disproving by the
preponderance of the evidence that it had an improper purpose in accumulating its earnings. How-
ever, some courts have held that by proving the unreasonableness of the accumulations, the gov-
ernment forces the taxpayer to disprove by a clear preponderance of the evidence that no improper
purpose existed. See, e.g., Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 267 (1st Cir. 1963).
'The original accumulated earnings tax provisions used the term "prima facie evidence" in the
"reasonableness" section. In the 1938 revision of the provisions, the "reasonableness" section was
strengthened by replacing the term "prima facie evidence" with the word "determinative." Con-
gress noted that "the proposal is to strengthen this Section by requiring the taxpayer .. .to prove
the absence of any purpose to avoid surtaxes upon shareholders after it has been determined that
the earnings and profits have been unreasonably accumulated." See S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938) as quoted in Palmer, Tax Court Renews Its Pelton Error On No Need for Accu-
mulated Earnings, 12 J. TAXATION 74 (1960) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has also
pointed out that "the purpose of the legislation is to compel the company to distribute any profits
not needed for the conduct of the business .... " Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S.
693, 699 (1940). In 1954 Congress again showed a desire that the "reasonableness of the accumu-
lations" have significance by enacting a tax credit under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 535(c).
Under section 531 the accumulated earnings tax is levied only on the accumulated taxable income
for the year, and section 535(c) provides that the taxpayer may deduct from the accumulated
taxable income those earnings and profits for the year "retained for the reasonable needs of the
business," minus long-term capital gains. Thus, applying section 535(c), if the jury decides that
the accumulation of earnings was reasonable, a determination that the taxpayer had an improper
purpose in accumulating its earnings is meaningless. See Palmer, supra. Notwithstanding the im-
proper purpose, the basis on which the tax would be levied could be zero, so that no accumulated
earnings tax would have to be paid.
From the testimony developed at a post-trial hearing it appears that the reason the jury an-
swered the second interrogatory in the negative was that the jurors had the mistaken belief that
the government would win the case if the first interrogatory were answered in the affirmative, and
that answering the second interrogatory in the affirmative might result in a prison sentence for the
sole shareholder of Donruss. This would explain why the instant case seems to be one of those rare
cases where the government succeeds in proving unreasonableness and then loses the case. See also
Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., 44 T.C. 53 (1965), where the court found the accumulated earn-
ings of the taxpayer unreasonable, but relieved the taxpayer from liability on the basis that tax-
payer had no purpose to avoid personal income taxes on its shareholders.
I9See text accompanying notes 3 through 8 supra.
earnings was unreasonable, the taxpayer can rebut the presumption of
improper purpose and win its case by proving that the purpose in ac-
cumulating earnings was not violative of section 532. Although there has
been some question of whether a corporation which accumulates its earn-
ings because of a good faith mistake in judgment can escape liability for
the accumulated earnings tax," it has been held that a mistake based on
an honest belief that the accumulation was no greater than was reasonably
necessary will relieve the corporation from liability.'" Spite, miserliness and
stupidity may also be grounds for rebutting the presumption of improper
purpose which arises when the government proves that the corporation's
accumulation of income was greater than the reasonable needs of the busi-
ness demanded."
II. THE PURPOSE TEST-CONFLICTING CONSTRUCTIONS
In the majority of cases decided under section 532 the courts have not
concerned themselves with defining what Congress meant by "the pur-
pose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its [the corporation's]
shareholders."' 4 Most courts have simply quoted from section 532, weighed
the evidence presented, and determined that the taxpayer had failed to
establish that tax avoidance was not "the purpose" behind the accumula-
tions." However, a few courts have attempted to construe the meaning of
the term "the purpose,"" resulting in three conflicting conclusions.
In Barrow Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner," the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that all the trial court need find is that the taxpayer had a purpose
to avoid individual income taxes on its shareholders." Thus, a corporation
which had several purposes in accumulating its income, one of which was
to avoid tax on its shareholders, would be liable for the accumulated earn-
ings tax. The Tenth Circuit came to the same conclusion in World Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States," a case arising under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939."
"Casey v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1959) (concurring opinion); B. BITTKER &
J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 6.02 (2d ed.
1966).
"2 id.
" See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS § 6.02 (2d ed. 1966). But cf. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d
495 (4th Cit. 1960) (reasonable purpose required).
4See, e.g., James H. Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1964); R. Gsell &
Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1961); Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner,
274 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1960); Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958); Trico Products v. McGowan, 169 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1948);
Zeigler, The New Accumulated Earnings Tax: A Survey of Recent Decisions, 22 TAX L. REV. 77
(1966).
1" Id.
'See, e.g., United States v. Duke Laboratories, Inc., 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964); Young
Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 267 (1st Cir. 1963); Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner,
294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1961); World Publishing Co. v. United
States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 911 (1948).
"294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1961).
"s The court reasoned that the badly-needed presumption raised when the government proves
that accumulations were beyond the reasonable needs of the business would be destroyed if a pri-
mary or dominant purpose test were used. 294 F.2d at 82.
1169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 911 (1948).
20Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 102(a).
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In a recent decision, United States v. Duke Laboratories," the Second
Circuit placed a narrower interpretation on the wording of section 532.
The court reasoned that because section 532 requires the corporation to
be "formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding" income tax on its
shareholders, Congress must have intended that shareholder tax avoidance
be the sole purpose of the corporation in accumulating its earnings."2 Ac-
cording to the court, if Congress had meant for the courts to use the term
"primary" or even "a," it would have used one of those terms in its many
revisions of the tax provision.
A middle-ground approach was taken in Young Motor Co. v. Commis-
sioner," where the First Circuit, basing its decision on Commissioner v.
Duberstein,A came to the conclusion that the corporate taxpayer had to
have a primary or dominant purpose to avoid the individual tax by its
accumulations. The court noted that because corporate directors and offi-
cers will almost certainly realize the shareholder tax advantage which re-
sults from the corporation's accumulating the income rather than dis-
tributing it, application of the "a purpose" test would subject almost
every corporation to this accumulated earnings tax. However, the court
did not consider the possibility that Congress meant for the "sole purpose"
test to be applied in determining wrongful accumulations of corporate
income.
III. DONRUSS CO. V. UNITED STATES
In Donruss the taxpayer corporation relied on the Duke Laboratories
case, where the Second Circuit had placed a narrow interpretation on the
wording in section 532. The corporation argued that because Congress used
the terminology "the purpose," it must have meant exactly that, and the
Duke "sole purpose" test should be applied. The government, on the other
hand, contended that the question was well settled that only a purpose was
necessary to impose the penalty tax,' relying primarily on Barrow.
After discussing the above cases and the "primary purpose" test used in
the Young Motor Co. case, the Donruss court concluded that none of
these precedents would be controlling. Instead, the court sought to analo-
gize the "purpose" test of section 532 to the "motive" test used in de-
termining whether a gift was made "in contemplation of death" under
section 2035 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 8 and concluded: "In our
view there is no sound reason why the 'dominant, controlling, or impelling'
motive test employed in connection with the gift in contemplation of
21 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964).
21 1d. at 282.
23 316 F.2d 267 (1st Cir. 1963).
24363 U.S. 278 (1960). The case involved the exclusion of a business gift from gross income
under INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 102. The Supreme Court held that in deciding whether a tax-
payer has a gift under S 102, the court must determine the primary intent of the alleged donor.
25The rule is definitely not well settled. See United States v. Duke Laboratories, 337 F.2d 280
(2d Cir. 1964); Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 267 (1st Cir. 1963); Barrow Mfg.
Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1961); World Publishing
Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 911 (1948).
21 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2035(a) provides that "the value of the gross estate shall include
the value of all property to the extent of an interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of death."
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death provision should not be applied to the accumulated earnings tax
provision."27 In comparing the two tax provisions, the court noted: "To
hold that the dominant, controlling, or impelling motive criterion is inap-
plicable in the case of the accumulated earnings tax provision would re-
quire that we make a distinction where no material difference exists."2
IV. THE VALIDITY OF THE DONRUss ANALOGY
Is the "motive" test used in the gift in contemplation of death provision
properly analogous to the "purpose" test of section 532? The accumulated
earnings tax was enacted to prevent persons from using the corporate form
to reduce their individual income taxes by ultimately taking the corporate
earnings at a capital gains rate. The tax itself is a penalty tax." It is levied
at a set percentage of the amount of earnings found to have been unrea-
sonably accumulated;"' and although it is in addition to the taxes the cor-
poration would otherwise have to pay, it is in lieu of the taxes the indi-
vidual owners would have paid had the earnings been properly distributed
in the form of dividends. The original accumulated earnings provision
required fraudulent intent on the part of the persons responsible for the
conduct of the corporation."2 Although the word fraudulent was dropped
from the provision, the purpose behind the tax is still to tax those persons
who use the corporate form to avoid personal income taxes.
The inclusion in the gross estate, under section 203 5 (a), of the amount
of a gift made in contemplation of death is meant to accomplish the same
objective as the accumulated earnings tax; its purpose is to keep individuals
from avoiding the higher estate tax rates by making gifts at the lower gift
tax rate just prior to death." Although the two provisions can be distin-
guished on the basis of the rate of taxation imposed, 4 this difference does
not go to the purpose behind them. Both sections 533 and 203 5 (b) set out
presumptions that take effect if the government is able to prove certain
facts," in which case the taxpayer must overcome the presumptions by the
27 384 F.2d at 297.
2
8 Id. at 298.
" See J. SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, 1861-1938, at 983-87
(1939).
" See Casey v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1959); B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 6.01 (2d ed. 1966).
s The accumulated earnings tax is the sum of 27/2% of the accumulated taxable income not
in excess of $100,000 and 38/2'% of the accumlated taxable income in excess of $100,000. INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 531.
22 See note 5 supra.
aDenniston v. Commissioner, 106 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1939).
4Under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 2035(a) the value of the gift is taxed at the estate tax
rates as if it had been transferred through the estate, whereas the accumulated earnings tax is
at a set rate for all corporate taxpayers. However, the distinction is lost when it is considered that
both taxes are levied in lieu of the tax that should have been paid if there had been no attempt
at avoidance. The accumulated earnings tax is now at a set rate rather than at the personal income
tax rate of each shareholder because of the constitutional problem regarding the taxing of share-
holders on undistributed profits. See authorities cited note 5 subra.
" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 533 (a), sets out that "[T]he fact that earnings and profits . . .
are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be determinative of
the purpose to avoid the income tax ... .
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 2035(b) sets out that "If the decedent within a period of 3 years
ending with the date of his death . . . transfers an interest in property . . . such transfer . . .
shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death .... "
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preponderance of the evidence.
In construing the applicability of the two tests, a court must look to
the congressional intent behind the statutes as well as to the entire context
of the acts."' Since the two provisions involve essentially the same subject
matter, scope, and aim, it seems that the court properly read them to-
gether in construing their meaning. 7
V. CONCLUSION
In addition to the validity of the analogy drawn by the Donruss court,
the "dominant, controlling, or impelling purpose" test set out in Donruss
should be preferred over the "a purpose" test of Barrow and the "sole
purpose" Duke Laboratories test for practical reasons as well. First, it would
be almost impossible for a taxpayer to prove that not even "a" purpose to
avoid personal taxes was involved in the decision to accumulate earnings.
Under the "a purpose" test the tax avoidance motive need only be one of
taxpayer's motives,"' and almost any corporate director realizes that by
accumulating earnings the corporation will be saving personal income taxes
for its shareholders. Mere realization of such an advantage would make the
avoidance purpose one of the taxpayer's motives, notwithstanding the sig-
nificance of this particular motive in the ultimate decision to accumulate
earnings.
Similarly, if the "sole purpose" test were used, the taxpayer would not
find it difficult to show that at least one other motive was involved in the
decision to accumulate earnings. If the taxpayer need only show by the
preponderance of the evidence that the tax avoidance purpose was not his
only purpose, his burden of proof would be easily met, and the statute
would fail to accomplish its designed objective.
T. Winston Weeks
Mechanics' Liens: Statutory Retainage Versus
Holder in Due Course
Another conflict in the long struggle for priority among competing
mechanics' lien claimants was recently waged in a Texas court. It has long
been the practice for an owner to execute to his general contractor a nego-
tiable note secured by a lien on his property, both of which the contractor
85Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948); United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S.
600 (1941).
37United States v. Korpan, 237 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 354 U.S.
271 (1957); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 156 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1946), aff'd, 330 U.S.
248 (1947).3 8 Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1961);
World Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 911
(1948).
(Vol. 22
